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STATEMENT OF FAOTS 
Appellant respectfully takes exception to Respon-
dPnt's Stah•rnent of Facts. That Statement does not 
aecnrately reflect the record. The basis for this disagree-
ment is that the Respondent has failed in its summary 
to eonsider the fact that the disputed issues raised at 
tlw trial were decided by the jury. The jury found that 
an agreement between the parties was in existence, that 
tlH' same was hreaehed, and as a direct result M & S 
Construction Co. was damaged. Since all factual matters 
1 
are now resolved in favor of the Plaintiff, it is funda-
mental that the evidence be reviewed in this light. The 
question before us now is not whether or not the jury 
should have believed the Respondent's denials or 
theories, hut rather whether or not there was sufficient 
evidence to sustain the jury's verdict. The Appellant 
contends that the following facts amply show that there 
was such evidence. 
Respondent in its brief, as during the trial, spent 
considerable time in attempting to show that the bid of 
l\I & S Construction Co. on the Lost Greek Project was 
from the onset unsound. Such reasoning was an attempt 
to convince the jury that the troubles of M & S Construc-
tion Co. were due to the faulty business acumen of the 
principals of M & S rather than the Bank's breach of 
its agreement. It should be noted that Respondent sub-
mitted no direct testimony to corroborate this theory 
in the form of cost analysis or other accounting data. 
The Respondent's only evidence that the bid made 
with Steenberg was inadequate was based on Exhibit N 
entitled "Abstract of Bids." Respondent states in its 
brief that the Abstract of Bids, though available to M 
& S, was not reviewed by it prior to the time it entered 
into the bid with Steenberg. For what importance may be 
given to such assertion, a review of the record shows that 
the Abstract was reviewed prior to the time that the bid 
was made (T-147, 148, 150). It should be noted also 
that the Bank had the same right to review the Abstract 
before entering into the loan agreement with M & S, 
as it was a matter of public record (T-161). Suffice to 
2 
say, the Bank, which entered into the loan agreement 
based upon the strength o.f the M & S contract with Steen-
lwrg and the anticipated profits to be made from said 
job, did not itself consider the Abstract of Bids of any 
importance to the success of its agreement. 
The contract between M & S and Steenberg was 
not a bid comparable to those submitted by other 
general contractors but, rather, was entered into on a 
negotiated basis not only as to cost but also as to terms 
of performance. For example, this agreement contained 
provisions which prote0ted M & S from certain contin-





In the event it becomes necessary to drill 
and blast in the access road the work shall 
be performed at no cost to M & S Construc-
tion & Engineering Go. and shall be paid by 
Steenberg Construction Co. 
In event grouting is needed in the diversion, 
such grouting shall be paid by Steenberg 
Construction Co. 
It is the intention of Steenberg Construction 
Co. and M & S Construction & Engineering 
Co. that the earth materials shall be moved 
only one time. If it is necessary to move 
the earth materials more than once, each 
move of said material shall be extra work 
and Steenberg Construction Co. will pay M 
& S Construction & Engineering for the type 
materials moved. 
On item #4, it is intended that this work be 
done with scrapers. If however, shovel or 
draglines are needed the extra expense is to 
be paid by Steenberg Construction Co. 
3 
It appears, therefore, that the bid comparisons were 
immaterial because the existing agreement was radically 
different than the other bids on total excavation. 
The Respondent raised the question of Exhibit N 
upon cross-examination of Russell D. Stoker, a principal 
of M: & S and the person primarily responsible as to 
cost in negotiating the sub-contract with Steenberg. Mr. 
Stoker testified ('I.1-111, 112) that he held a Civil Engi-
ll('('l' Degree and had twenty years of experience in the 
engineering field. Included within this experience was 
employment with the Bureau of Reclamation and work 
as a private consultant. 
l\fr. Stoker testified that comparison bids were not 
the real criteria for entering into contracts of this na-
ture. rrhe major consideration was, rather, the unit 
"price for which we could move the dirt with the equip-
ment we anticipated using to move the dirt with." (T-
196) He further testified that bid prices, particularly 
as to overall costs, were not too helpful in submitting 
and negotiating a bid with Steenberg (T-146). Mr. 
Stoker testified (T-167, 168) that a detailed study was 
made in regard to the anticipated costs of the Lost 
Creek Project sub-contract. Initially, he computed the 
time that it would take each piece of equipment to make 
each separate trip to and from the areas concerned. 
1'here was a further computation as to how much dirt 
each unit of equipment could move on a daily basis. 
Based upon the8e figurt>s, a decision was made as to 
the cost of each move and as to each unit of work. 
This procedure was the basis for arriving at the pro-
4 
jt>ctecl costs prior to entering into the sub-contract. The 
hasis of computation used by M & S in its bid, there-
fon\ was careful and prudent. 
Certainly, it cannot be said that the jury acted 
capriciously in rejecting Respondent's theory, and in 
lwlit>ving Appellant's testimony as to the basis of antici-
pated profits. The negotiation and subsequent sub-con-
traet with Steenberg ·was approached in a businesslike 
manner and there was no imminent danger of complete 
financial annihilation. 
Respondent in its brief correctly states that subse-
quent to August 22, 1963 the Bank loaned an additional 
s11m in the amount of $25,000.00. The statement, however, 
that M. & S was again having financial trouble is not 
snpported by the record. However, one can assume that 
if M & S requested a loan, there was a need for addi-
tional moneys. In answer to Respondent's brief, M & S 
was not prior to October 23, 1963 having major trouble 
with its sub-contract. On the contrary, on October 10, 
196i1, the Bank received a letter from Steenberg, Plain-
tiff's Exhibit F, which stated that as of that date M & S 
was performing satisfactorily and that Steenberg had 
no knowledge of any default, claims or problems. Re-
mittance was slow on the estimates, not due to the fault 
of l\T & S but, rather, to the change in location of the 
government fiscal agency. This fact obviously made the 
Bank nervous because it had exceeded its loan limits, 
hut it is certainly not a basis for stating that M & S 
was in financial problems. Also, in the early part of 
Ortoher (T-G6), Mr. Emil Walsh of Steenberg Construe-
5 
tion Co. met with Mr. Barlow of the Bank and to.Id him 
that the job '.Vas progressing satisfactorily and informed 
him that he expected a profit of $70,000.00 plus the 
acquisition of certain equipment ('T-66). Mr. Walsh 
testified that at the beginning of a job of this kind, the 
cost figure would be excessive. This explanation "seemed 
to satisfy him as to the feasibility of the job.'' :Mr. Stoker 
in his testimony explained in great detail the conversa-
tion he had with Mr. Barlow concerning the core trench 
(T-116 to 123), which obviously raised the cost of the 
job and, further, Mr. Stoker explained the delay in the 
payment for this work. This evidence clearly explains 
away the cost discrepancy raised by Respondent. The 
Respondent's argument that the Bank ran into an unex-
pected situation which would justify the breach was 
negated by the jury. The evidence shows that prior to 
the breach, the job was progressing satisfactorily and 
that the breach caused M & S to be defaulted on the job, 
and thns to lose the fruits of its contract. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE 
JURY FINDING UPON ANSWER TO SPECIAL INTERROG-
ATORY THAT THERE WAS AN AGREEMENT BY RESPON-
DENT TO FINANCE APPELLANT'S LOST CREEK SUB-
CONTRACT. 
Respondent Bank contends that the oral testimony 
admitted by tht> Court to assist the jury in finding that 
there was sueh an agreement was admitted in violation 
of the Parol J;~vidence Rule. 
6 
Respondent begins to build its argument on this 
point from a definition of the Parol Evidence Rule found 
in an article entitled "Parol Evidence - The Utah Ver-
sion" by Professor Ronan E. Degnan found at 5 Utah 
Law Review 158 ·where Professo,r Degnan says at Page 
159: 
"Parol ('vicknce is not admissible to vary, add to 
or contradict the terms of a written instrument." 
On that same page, Professor Degnan also said of 
such definition: 
"It has only brevity to commend it; a moment's 
reflection tells every lawyer that it applies to 
evic10nce of oral or written tran1sactions and that 
as freqnently as not the evidence, written or oral, 
is admissible. In short, it is a poor thing to call 
a rule." 
Of course, it was alleged by M & Sand found by the 
jury that Respondent agreed to renew the short-term 
notes from time to time, and Respondent cites 32A C.J.S. 
'.25-1-, I~vidence, Sec. 895 in support of its proposition that 
parol evidence cannot be introduced to show that there 
was an agreement at the time of making of a note that it 
would be renewed at maturity. Counsel did not, however, 
refer to 32A C.J.S. 312, Evidence, Sec. 930, where, under 
the topic heading "Limitations and Exceptions to Rule," 
it was stated: 
"F:vidcnce Not Inconsistent with Writing. 
In general, the Parol Evidence Rule does not 
exclude evidence which does not tend to vary or 
contradict the written instrument. 
The Parol Evidence Rule does not preclude 
the reception of parol evidence with reference 
7 
to a rnattPr evi<lPrn·ed by the 1niting where such 
evidence relatt-s to a matter in pais or is of such 
a charaetPr that it does not tend to varv or contra-
dict the written instrument. · 
'l'hus, parol evidence which does not vary 
or ('ontradict the document under consideration 
is admissible to establish thP connection of the 
document with the case; to show matters as to 
which tlw instrument is silent; to explain how an 
agreern,mt is to be carried out; to shmv matters 
rPquir0<l to be shown by the contract, or without 
which it could not bP performed; to show the man-
ner in which the contract was performed; whether 
there was a breach of contract; and the effect 
thereof; and to show a particular mode of pay-
ment or discharge agreed on by the parties. 
Certainly the fact that a matter is evidenced 
by a writing cannot preclude the admission of 
parol evidencP of independent facts although they 
relatP to the same transaction. 
~Where a writing is executed in furtherance 
of a parol contract, evidence of such parol con-
tract does not off end against the rule forbidding 
alteration, addition or variation of a written con-
tract by parol." (Citing numerous cases including 
Yardley v. Swapp, 12 Utah 2d 146, 364 P.2d 4; 
for other Utah cases holding that parol evidence 
may be introduced to explain the purpose of a 
writing, see Charlton v. Hackett, 11 Utah 2d 389, 
360 P.2d 176, McCarren v. Merrill, 15 Utah 2d 
179, 389 P.2d 732, Continental Bank & Trust Com-
pany v. Stewart, 4 Utah 2d 228, 291 P.2d 890, and 
Continental Bank & Trust Company v. Bybee, 6 
Utah 2d 98, 306 P .2d 773). 
A n~view of tlwse pertinent authorities clearly shows 
that the oral testimony admitted here was properly re-
8 
ceivcd to explain the connection of the notes with the case 
and to explain how the agreement was to be carried out, 
and such testimony does not, in any way, clash with or 
contradict the terms of the notes which were in fact 
' ' 
executed in furtherance of the parol agreement found 
by the jury. 
Of the three cases which Respondent cites to support 
its position as set out in 32A C.J.S. 254, Evidence, Sec. 
805, supra, two, of them (Lincoln National Life Is1trance 
Com1w1111 v. Bastian, 31 F.2d 859, and Ford v. 8oitthern 
:lfotor Com1n11~1, 203 Ala. 170, 93 So. 902) relate solely 
and exclusively to written documents (a note and a life 
insnnmce policy) which are not, in any way, involved as 
a part of a more comprehensive oral agreement and, 
hence, such cases, being so factually dissimilar, are not 
pertinent or applicable to the case at bar. The third of 
these cases, Garrett v. Ellison, 93 Utah 184, 72 P.2d 499, 
involved a dispute between payees on a note, and the 
portion of that opinion cited by Respondent merely states 
that parol evidence could not be introduced to alter the 
payor's obligation to such contending joint payees. The 
opinion does, however, go on to recognize that: 
"A rule has been established that an agreement by 
parol which is collateral to the written contract 
and on a distinct subject may be proved." 
This position is also recognized in Higgins v. Belson, 
ii(i Idaho 73G, 1G8 P.2d 813, where the Court stated: 
" that it has long been the rule that when 
parties have not incorporated into an instrument 
all of the terms of their contract, evidence is ad-
missible to prove the existence of a separate oral 
9 
agreement as to any matter on which the docu-
ment is silent and which is not inconsistent with 
its terms. (Citing GarrPtt v. Ellison, supra)" 
The American Law Institute, Restatement of the 
Law of Contracts, Sec. 240, recognizes that oral agree-
ments are often made contemporaneously and simultan-
eously with written agreements: 
"Sec. 2-10. In What Cases Integration Does Not 
Affect Prior or Contemporaneous Agreements. 
( 1) An oral agreement is not superseded or 
invalidated by a subsequent or contemporaneous 
integration, nor a written agreement by a subse-
quent integration relating to the same subject-
matter, if the agreement is not inconsistent with 
the integrated contract, and 
(a) is made for separate consideration, or 
(b) is such an agreement as might naturally 
be made as a separate agreement by 
parties situated as were the parties to 
the written contract. 
(2) *'~**" 
Comment d. on Subsection (lb) specifically recog-
nizes that such oral agreements are very often made 
contemporaneously with negotiable instruments: 
''The justification of the Parol Evidence Rule 
is that when parties incorporate an agreement in 
a writing it is a reasonable assumption that every-
thing included in the bargain is set down in the 
writing. Though this assumption in most cases 
conforms to the facts, and the certainty attained 
by making the rule a general one affords grounds 
for its existence, there are cases where it is so 
natural to make a separate agreement, frequently 
oral, in regard to the same subject-matter, that 
10 
the Parol Evidence Rule does not deny effect to 
the collateral agreement. This situation is espec-
ially likely to arise when the writing is of a formal 
character and does not so readily lend itself to 
the inclusion of the whole agreem~nt as a writing 
which is no.t limited by law or custom to a particu-
lar form. Thus, agreements collateral to a nego-
tiable instrument if incorporated in it might de-
stro>- its negotiability, and in any event would 
deprive it of the simplicity of form characteristic 
of negotiable paper. So in connection with leases 
and other conveyances, collateral agreements re-
lating- to the same subject-matter have been held 
enforceable. These illustrations of what agree-
ments "'might naturally be made'' without inclu-
sion in an integrated contract are not exclusive. 
It is not essential that a particular provision 
would always or even usually be made in a sep-
arate collateral agreement. It is enough that 
making such a provision in that way is not so 
exceptional as to be odd or unnatural." 
It is, therefore, the position of Appellant that the 
terms of the notes were in no way altered, added to or 
contradicted by the oral testimony which was, in fact, 
received for the purpose of explaining the notes in 
terms of a contemporaneous and more comprehensive 
oral agreement to finance, as found by the jury. 
Now turning our consideration from an analysis of 
the legal authorities concerning parol evidence to an 
analysis of the evidence as received by the Court during 
the course of the trial, we note that Respondent has 
urgPd that the evidence of the agreement was entirely 
oral and not sufficient to support the jury's finding. 
Respondent's assumption is completely unfounded and 
lm\\·a rranted. 
11 
Significant and important written documents were 
!'f'('PivPd into evid<>nee by the Court during the course 
of tlw trial. One of tlwse was the document entitled 
"Assignment of l\foneys Due and to Become Due Under 
Contract'' (Exhibit B) which document was prepared 
by R('SpondL'nt's legal counsel, dated August 20, 1963, 
and coven,.d all estimates, funds, "moneys due or to be-
come drn;" to 1\1 & S from Steenberg under the contract 
dated.June 17, 196:3, and under the terms of which Assign-
mPnt l\f & S directed Steenberg to make all payments to 
the bank and constituted the bank its true and la,.vful 
agent to ask for, require and demand the moneys all 
of which moneys,funds and estimates were~igned as 
collateral security for loans made "and to be made" by 
the RPsIJondent bank to Appellant as collateral security 
for any and all liabilities "direct or indirect, absolute or 
contingent, dm~ or to become due, now existing or here-
after raising of" Appellant to Respondent Bank. 
It is significant to note that this assignment was not 
executed as collateral for any specified loan but rather 
was an assigrnrn•nt of "moneys due or to become due" 
as "collateral st>eurity for loans made and to be made" 
and as collatt>ral sf'curity for any and all liabilities "due 
or to become due, now existing or hereafter arising." 
Such languagP is entirPly consistent with and supports 
tlw jury's finding that there was a revolving credit 
arrangement as alleged by Appellant and that such short-
term notes were to be repayed out of moneys received 
from estimates or by renewal of such notes, if necessary. 
12 
Another writing, in addition to the Assignment, 
which supports the jury finding of the existence of an 
agre<~ment for revolving credit is the bank's liability 
ledger sheet (Ex. I~) which shows that such loans were, 
in fart, on one or more occasions paid and renewed on 
tlie same date or renewed the day following repayment. 
Such procedure fit in with the "pattern" acknowledged 
by the Respondc~nt's Executive Vice President, 1\1r. Bar-
low ( T-221, 222). Such procedure also fits the pattern of 
a revolving credit concept as defined in U.S. v. Butter-
1rn rtl1-J11dson Corporation, 297 F. 971: 
"'Tlw revolving fund is a brief expression of 
recent coinage which usually refers to a renewable 
credit over a definite period. In simple parlance, 
it relates usually to a situation where a banker 
or BH'Tchant extends credit for a certain amount 
·which can be paid off from time to time and then 
credit is again given not to exceed the same 
amount." 
Again, the existence of the agreement is confirmed 
and supported by competent ·written evidence and there 
is certainly nothing new or novel about the plan. Cases 
an~ lPgion sustaining agreements for a line of credit to 
he used as needed. The most recent Utah case on this 
point is Commercial Security Bank v. Hodson, 15 U.2d 
:388, 39;3 P.2d 482, in which this Court recognized the 
<>xistence of this type of financial arrangement in the 
business world. One of the cases cited by this Court in 
the~ Commercial Security Bank case was Merchants Bank 
of Canarla ?i. Sims, et al., 122 Wash. 206, 209 P. 1113, 
which was decided in 1922, but even then the use of 
"li11e of credit" agreements was recognized as an estab-
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lished method of carrying on financing transactions 
where the security is posted or the credit limit is estab-
lished. This latter case is in point on several phases of 
this appeal. 
Respondent has also questioned the sufficiency of 
the testimony which was received in addition to the 
written documents referred to above. Such testimony did 
not consist solely of the testimony of Mr. Stoker and 
Mr. l\fendenhall as alleged by Respondent. There was 
significant and important testimony received from other 
witnesses which will be reviewed here; however, let us 
first examine the testimony of Mr. Stoker and Mr. 
:Mendenhall in its entirety as it relates to this question 
rather than lifting isolated portions o.f such testimony 
out of the transcript and giving it a tortured and strfilned 
inte11Jretation out of context with the question now being 
considered. 
Mr. Stoker testified as follows concerning the discus-
sion at a meeting between members of his company and 
the Bank at which time the question of financing was the 
topic of conversation (T.-J 13): 
"And it was discuss(~d that the bank would fi-
nance U8 starting out with a $25,000.00 loan which 
would be paid with draws from the job as time 
progressed, and then as we needed financing 
again, there would be another $25,000.00 advance 
made or as the need arose." 
Continuing this same ans·wer, Mr. Stoker said (T.-
114): 
"And I discussed at that time with Mr. Bar-
low how I knmv or why I knew that we could 
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successfully complete the job, why we could make 
money on the job, approximately what we antici-
pated making, and why I felt we could make that; 
but, of course, we would need financing as we 
went along as any contractor needs. And par-
ticularly starting out a job in the early part, you 
might say in the early half perhaps of any job 
it takes rather extensive financing. And as you go 
along and begin to recover some more of vour 
money it would take less financing. · 
1f r. Olmstead: Now, if the Court please, I ob-
ject to the witness reminiscing on his experiences. 
He was asked to conversations that were had. 
A: That is exa:etly the conversations that was 
had." 
Respondent has referred to a portion of Mr. Stoker's 
testimony (T.-115) in an effort to show ~hat Mr. Stoker 
referred to an agreement to loan only $25,000.00; how-
evrr, \Ve must, of course construe this testimony within 
the context of the entire transaction and not attempt 
to attach a meaning· to such testimony which would be 
alien to tlw context in which it was being related by the 
witness. In addition, the bank's ledger sheet (Ex. E) 
will show that at the time of the making of this second 
loan there was still a prior loan of like amount outstand-
ing which circumstances were in accord with the nature 
of the agreement as alleged by M & S and as found by 
the jury. 
"v\T e had a great amount of money in other 
words invested in this hole, this core trench, that 
was not reflected in our draws. And it's the 
rPason we had to have $50,000.00 that got up to 
$60,000.00 loans from the bank who had agreed 
to finance us through this job." 
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Mr. Stoker later related a conversation between Mr. 
Barlo\\- and himself (T.-129): 
"A. Yr-rn and 1\fr. Barlow and mvself was 
pn·srnt. We pointc>d out to 1\T r. Barlo\~- that we 
had no source of funds other than the bank be-
cansl' they had agret>d to finance us in this job. 
~WP again discussed the reason we didn't have the 
fuwls is buried in that core trench up there that's 
sixt~--feet deep. 
Mr. Stoker also related a conversation which took 
place between himself and Mr. Harold Steed of the Bank 
which, although somewhat informal in nature, clearly 
shows what the understanding of this Bank official was 
with respect to the agreement to finance (T.-124): 
"A. 1\Ir. StPed said, 'Here we are, the bank 
financ-ing this job, making it possible for you men 
to rontinue to work on this job, and what do 
we get but a measly 8 % interest on our money.' 
He said, 'We ought to be entitled to a third of 
tlH' iirofits or something on this, because it's us 
financing you and keeping you going on this job 
that's making this job possible'." 
It is obvious then that 11r. Stoker's testimony was 
not nearly so limited as Respondent would have this 
Court believe, and when considered full~r is indeed com-
patible with the finding made by the jury with respect to 
the agre<'HlE'nt to finance. 
'rlw tPstimony of Mr. J arnes H. Mendenhall, when 
viewed in its Pntirety, also supports the jury finding. 
Mr. l\Iendm1hall said (T.-78, 79) with respect to a meet-
ing with the Bank officials at which time the agreement 
to financ-P was clisc-ussed: 
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"A. Y{t>ll, we told him, we told him about the 
project that we had, and ·we told him that we 
,,-anted to see if we could get operating capital 
to do this joh, and it was necessary to have this 
rnom'y in order to do the job. 
And we told him that we'd talked to, Com-
mercial Security Bank in Ogden and they recom-
mended that we go to the Ogden or Clearfield 
State Bank first. 
And so we took, took hours to go over this 
and talk to him about it. So he said he would have 
a nweting and let us know. 
::}'.! * * *" 
(In response to questions concermng the later 
meeting) 
"Q. And who was there on behalf of the 
bankJ 
A. There was Mr. Thornock and Mr. Harold 
Steed, Mr. vValter Steed and Mr. Barlow. 
Q. Now, what was the conversation on that 
occasion? 
A. vVe all sat in Mr. Barlows office and we 
discussed the possibilities of this project and of 
them financing us. And they, they said they 
would.'' 
'Vi th respect to a later meeting, Mr. Mendenhall had 
this to say about the revolving credit agreement (T.-82): 
"Q. Now, on this one we are talking about, 
was anything else said? 
A. This $25,000.00 had been increased to 
$50,000.00. 
Q. That was mentioned? 
A. Yes. 
Q. On the continuity basis~ 
A. Yes, sir." 
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Mr. Ml:'ndenhall also stated with respect to a con-
versation with the Bank offirials (T-107): 
"A. \V ell, they said that they had heard that 
we took this job too cheap, and they'd heard this 
through, from sources from their attorney; and 
the only way that they were going to be able to 
continue going with us is if we'd assign them the 
monies from the job at Cedar City." 
Respondent has attempted to make much of the fact 
that the second $25,000.00 loan was actually made, which 
is somewhat peculiar inasmuch as this is exactly what 
was alleged by Appellant and found by the jury. There 
is certainly nothing strange about the fact that the full 
$50,000.00 ·was not loaned initially and that the second 
$25,000.00 loan was withheld until such time as it was 
determined that there was a need for it. This second 
loan was made pursuant to the agreement and not as an 
afterthought or in violation of such agreement as Re-
spondent seems to be suggesting. In any event, the full 
$50,000.00 loan was made as alleged by M & S in its 
Complaint and the financing thereafter withdrawn com-
pletely and unexpectedly. 
Respondent has failed to mention the important 
testimony given by Mr. Emil Walsh, Vice President of 
Steenberg Construction Company, the prime contractor, 
and a man with over twenty years experience in the con-
struction industry. With respect to the agreement to 
finance, Mr. ·walsh stated (T.-58, 60, 61): 
"Q. Now, during the course of your dealings 
with these individuals vou mentioned in M & S, 
did you l'Vt'r havP any ~ccasion to meet with any 
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individuals connected with the Clearfield State 
Bank? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Now, could you tell me about when was 
the first occasion? 
A. To the best of my memory, it would be 
late in August or early in September. 
Q. And where was the meeting held? 
A. At the bank at Clearfield. 
Q. And who would have been present to. the 
best of your recollection~ 
A. Mr. Barlow was present and later called 
in a \V alter Steed. 
Q. Now, will you tell the jury what was 
said and done at that meeting in regard to Lost 
Creek1 
* * * * 
(Discussion between counsel and the Court) 
A. Well, there was some small talk between 
Mr. Barlow and Mr. Smith and myself introduc-
ing one another and talking about, oh, prelimi-
nary conversations to become acquainted. And 
then got down to the reason for my being brought 
over there was to discuss credit or loans for the 
:M & S Construction Company. And the bank 
·wanted to understand what the type work or the 
procedure that they were going through. 
"' * * * 
(Discussion between counsel and the Court) 
A. Mr. Barlow stated that some loans had 
been already made to M & S and there was dis-
cussion about continuing loans, and we discussed 
the project, the possible profits that were there, 
the methods of payment of them, what I expected, 
and what would be done, and Mr. Barlow stated 
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that he was going to take care of his boys; that 
hP had !mown Mr. Smith since he was a boy, he 
had known J\fr. Stoker since he was a boy; he 
did not knmv Mr. Mendenhall. 
And it ·was a very nice meeting, and that 
terminated it." 
Even the reluctant testimony of Mr. Barlow, Vice 
President of Clearfield Bank, on cross-examination lends 
credence to the existence of such agreement as found 
by the jury. When questioned concerning his deposition 
of March 27, 1964, Mr. Barlow stated (T.-220, 221, 222): 
''Q. All right. Was this question asked, and 
tlw amnver that accompanies it, Mr. Barlow: 
·~~ow certainly - and you can answer that 
"yes" or "no" - you certainly thought that they 
were in a position to repay that? 
'Answer: \,Ye thought it would be paid out 
of this next draw.' 
\Y as that question and answer asked you? 
A. Referring to this first twenty-five thou-
sand. 
Q. Yes. 
A. Yes. rrhat's the way we thought it would 
he paid out. 
(~. Then this question was put to you, was 
it not, Mr. Barlow: 
'Question: And actually that was the pro-
gram you had with them, wasn't it, that you 
would advance on a short term basis this money 
to nH'et payrolls and then would be covered by 
thPir draw against the general contract 1 
'Answer: That ·was the beginning with no 
prornisP of ('Ontinuity after that. The first twenty-
five thousand would be paid back the same way 
with the next.' 
A. The first -
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MR. OLl\ISTEAD: rrhe first~ 
A. First twenty-five thousand? 
Q. (By Mr. Elton) Yes. "The first twenty-
five thousand "-ould be paid back the same way 
with the next." 
And then this question was put to you, was 
it not, :!\Ir. Barlow, under oath: 
'That's right, but that was the pattern f 
And you answered: 'Yes.' is that right~ 
A. Yes, that's what I -
Q. And the question was asked you: 'Of 
the idea at the time~' 
And your answer vvas: 'That's right.' 
And that was under oath, in March of 1964, 
was it not, l\f r. Barlow~ 
A. Yes. But I make it very plain that was 
the beginning, with no promise. 
Q. Never mind. I just asked you, sir, if 
you gave that response to those questions, under 
oath, on March 27th, 1964. 
A. Yes. That was -
Q. Yes. 
A. That was the beginning, yes." 
There is one other thread which was woven into 
the record upon which the finding of the agreement 
was based and that is the testimony concerning the 
function o.f Clair Nielsen who, although employed by 
S\l & S as their au di tor, was virtually an employee of 
the Bank for all practical purposes assigned to the task 
of overseeing the financial matters of M & S and re-
porting to the Bank. It was his duty to release checks 
and keep the bank fully advised as to the financial con-
dition of 1\1 & S. 
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In this res1)ect, Mr. ·walsh testified (T.-G2, 63): 
"Mr. Barlow had asked Mr. Nielsen would he 
go HI) and keep him advised regarding payments. 
And Mr. Nielsen had stated that he certainly 
would give Mr. Barlmv the truth and the infor-
mation in every matter. 'rhe only ·way that any-
thing could be avoided from his knowing would 
be that if invoices or statements had been with-
held. And Mr. Smith reassured Mr. Nielsen at 
that time that he would withhold nothing from 
him. And with that, why everybody seemed satis-
fied." 
Mr. Mendenhall testified ( T .-105) : 
"A. Was Mr. Barlow insisted that Mr. Niel-
sen sign the checks, payroll checks, and have a 
record of, of ·what went on, and so forth." 
Mr. Mendenhall, again (T-107): 
"A. "'Well, we were to write these payroll 
checks - and undPr Mr. Barlow's direction, he 
told us to write these payroll checks, and when-
eyer they come in to the Bank that he would take 
care of them and Mr. Nielsen had to verify that 
these, with Mr. Barlow, that these men were on 
the pa~'roll, and so forth." 
Mr. Stoker tPstifo•d (T.-128, 129): 
"As it was, the draw didn't come in until the 
24th or 25th. So there was one payroll in there 
that the checks were issued to the employees un-
der tlw instructions by Mr . .Jesse Barlow - we 
knew we didn't have funds in there, we knew we 
could not issue these checks, no one could issue 
checks hut the arcountant, and it was under Mr. 
Barlow's authority that these checks was issued 
to rnePt our payroll when we knew we didn't have 
funds." 
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'The whol0 pattern then was that Clair Nielsen, nomi-
nally the accountant for M & S, was, in fact, more nearly 
an employee of the Bank whose responsibility it was to 
protect the Respondent Bank's financial interests, to 
report to l\fr. Barlovv, and to issue payroll checks at 
l\Ir. Barlow's direction. 
The evidence both documentary and oral, when 
viewed in its entirety, most certainly establishes the 
existence of an agreement to finance as alleged by Ap-
pellant. The reflection of the transactions on the Bank's 
ledger, the written assignment, the peculiar arrange-
ment with Appellant's accountant, and the whole tenor 
of the arrangement must be considered as highly un-
orthodox and unusual procedures if we are to accept 
Respondent Bank's explanation of the circumstances sur-
rounding these loans. Such facts are not, however, in 
the least way unusual or unorthodox if we are to con-
strue them as having arisen contemporaneously with and 
in support of an agreement to finance as was found by 
the jury. 
POINT II 
THE AGREEMENT FOUND BY THE JURY TO HAVE 
BEEN MADE BETWEEN THE PARTIES IS NOT BARRED 
BY THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS. 
Before proceeding to answer Respondent's Argu-
rnt>nt, it will be helpful to set forth the exact agreement 
which the jury found to exist between Appellant and 
Respondent in its answer to special interrogatories 
( R-87) : 
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''Qnestion X o. l: Did the Defendant, on or 
a liout A ngnst 23, 19G3, enter into an agreement 
with the Plaintiff to lencl to Plaintiff as and when 
requirod hy th<> Plaintiff for the purpose of pro-
viding finances to carry on its work under the 
terms and provisions of the subcontract between 
Plaintiff and Steenberg Construction Company 
an amount not to excePd $50,000.00 by lending to 
Plaintiff the s1m1 of $25,000.00 on August 23, 1963 
to be due September 15, 1963 and to renew said 
loan from time to time to the date of final pay-
ment by Steenberg Construction Company. 
Ans'.ver: Yes." 
It is noted that Respondent did not set forth the 
special interrogatory in its brief and by paraphrasing 
failed to include important language, particularly the 
"as and when required" provision. 
It should be pointed out at this time that there are 
really two separate agreements involved here: one, the 
agTeement to finance, which the jury found; and, two, 
the subcontract between Appellant and Steenberg Con-
struction Company. 
Respondent has stated that ~Ir. Walsh testified that 
the fastest the work on the subcontrad could have been 
compleh•d was two years. (Brief of Respondent, Pg. 13) 
In fact, Mr. ~Walsh said no such thing. What he did say 
was that, "'I'he work could have been completed in two 
eontraet st•asons" (T.-75) which is somewhat different 
and does not negate the possibility of performance within 
one year. At any rate, as will be shown, it is a ques-
tion of whether or not the terms of the agreement itself 
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lll'Pelnde performance within one year and the determi-
nation of such question must be made by lo·oking solely 
to thr f<'rms of the agreement and not to extrinsic evi-
dPnee. Appellant contends that if the terms of the ao-ree-l:l 
rnrnt itself do not prohibit performance within one year 
tliat performance is, therefore, possible within one year 
and the agreement is not barred by the Statute not-
\\'i thstanding that the performance therof may, in fact, 
tab' more than one year or that the parties intended it 
to take more than one year. In opposition to this view, 
H<·s11ondent extracts a phrase from 37 C.J.S. 558, Frauds, 
Statute of, Sec. 50, but fails to reveal to this Court what 
that encyclopedia says in the sentence following that 
from ·which th0 phrase is extracted: 
"\Yhere there is such po.ssibility of perform-
ance ·within a year, it does not matter that the 
parties may have held the opinion that the work 
under the contract might be extended beyond the 
period of one year, or that the contract may have 
given the parties more than one year to perform 
their obligations or that, as a matter of fact, the 
performance actually did extend over a greater 
period than one year." 
Respondent refers to the leading case of Warner v. 
Te.rns & Pacific R. Co., infra, in asserting that the ques-
tion of the length of time in which a contract may be 
performed must be determined "according to the reason-
alJlP interpretation of its terms." Again, Respondent has 
~<·lPcted a phrase from a multi-page decision of an ap-
1wllatl' court; hmYevcr, Appellant does not quarrel with 
thP elairn that such contract must be viewed "according 
to the reasonable interpretation of its terms." Respond-
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ent has made a mistake, however. The words "fair and 
rea~:;onahle'' refer not to a determination of probability 
of actual performance within one year, but rather to the 
terms of the contract itself and whether or not a "fair 
and reasonable" interpretation would admit the possi-
bility of performance within one year. In other words, 
"fair and reasonable" refers to the terms of the agree-
ment itself and not to the facts surrounding the circum-
stances of performance as alleged by Respondent. This 
was the view taken in Hellings v. Wright, 29 Cal. App. 
649, 156 P. 365, which was cited by Respondent. As fur-
ther indication that this case actually supports Appel-
lant's view and not Respondent's view, the following 
language from Page 368 of the Pacific Reporter is noted: 
"The statute does not declare void a contract 
which may not be performed ·within a year or 
which is no.t likely to be performed within that 
period. It includes only agreements which fairly 
and reasonably interpreted do not admit of a 
valid execution within the year." (Emphasis 
added.) 
In Kressly v. District Bond Company, 138 Cal. App. 
565, 32 P.2d 1112, the ·Court stated at page 1114 of the 
Pacific Reporter: 
"Whether the agreement is invalid under the 
Statute of Frauds as urged by Appellant may be 
determined by the test laid down in M cK eany v. 
Black, 117 0~1. 587, 4-9 P. 710, as follows: 
'If the contract, by its terms, is not to be 
performed within a year, it is void; b?-t _if it 
may "by its terms" be performed withm a 
year, it is not even though it may not bt> 
}wrfo.rnwd or is not likely to be performed 
within that time.' 
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"The statute does not declare void a contract 
which may not be performed within a vear or 
which is not likely to be performed within that 
period. It includes only agreements which fairly 
and reasonably interpreted do not admit of a 
valid execution within a year." (All emphasis 
added.) 
Respondent has also relied upon Sec. 500 of Willis-
ton on Contracts. It is noted that this section is entitled 
"Contracts "N" ot Intended to be Performed ·within a 
Y(•ar." A distinction is made in this section between 
contracts which can be performed within a year and 
eontracts which cannot be performed within a year. Such 
as can be performed within a year are referred to as 
follows: 
"l. A contract which can be performed as 
the parties intend that it shall be performed with-
in a year though they fully expect that perform-
ance will take a longer period and" (proceeding 
on to the second class). 
1This class of contracts describes that into which the 
agreement to finance falls, and any performance thereof 
would have been just as the parties had intended; namely, 
(1) the subcontract would have been completed even 
though the parties fully expected it to take longer than 
one year, or (2) M & S would have required no financing 
bPyond the one-year period. (More ·will be said later of 
this second point.) Therefore, the distinction which this 
section makes is not applicable to the case at bar. It 
should be pointed out, however, that this same section 
µ;oes on to say: 
''On the other hand, if the contemplated mode 
of performance might possibly be carried out in 
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less t lian one yPar, the con tr ad would not he 
witl1in tlw statute .... " (Citing Bickel v. Wessin-
.rrer, 58 Or. 98, 113 P.:-l+, holding an oral agr<'<_'rnent 
tliat a mortgagor might rPdeem at any time within 
thrP<' y1·ars not to lw ~within the statutti.) 
Respondent has abo reliPd upon Stanley v. Levy 
and .J. Zentner Comvany, lG Nev. -1-32, 112 P.2d 10-17, 
which quotes from Fourth Edition of Browne on Statute 
of Frauds (the Fifth Edition was published in 1895); 
howevt>r, in tliat ease the testimony showed and the Court 
found that then• ~was no contract, and even if there were, 
hoth irnrties testified that their intended agreement, by 
its terms, would last for more than two years. Inas-
much as tht>r<-' \Vas no contract found, this case is fac-
tually dissimilar to the case at bar and is not properly 
cited hy Respondent in support of its position. 
RcspondPnt has also relied upon Markowitz Broth-
ers, Inc. v. Jolin A. Volpe Construction Company, 209 
l~.Supp. 339 (1962). This case was decided upon Florida 
law wltieh, in the opinion of the District Judge writing 
tlw decision admittedly represents a mino.rity view. Be-
for<> going· on to decide the specific question before that 
court, the ovinion makes r<>ference to the majority view 
(which Appellant urges in this appeal) and the numerous 
authorities in support thereof as follows: 
"It is amiarent from a consideration of the 
texts and L'.Ommentators (-1-9 Am. Jnr. Statute of 
Frauds, See. 23-:37; Brmvne on Statute of Frauds, 
0th FM., SPc. 271, et seq.; 3 \:Villiston on Contracts, 
i3rcl 11Jd., SPr. 500 Pt sPq.; 25 R.C.L. Sec. 452 et 
seq.; U9 ALR G:3+, Anno.; Statute of Frauds 
against oral contrads not to bl' performed within 
a ~.:ear), as \\'Pll as thP lt>ading cases (e.g. ~Walker 
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v .. Johnson, 9G U.S. -12-1, 2-! L.Ed 83-1; \Varner v. 
Texas and Pacific Railway Company, 164 U.S. 
-t18, ~7 S.Ct. 147, -11 L.Ed. 495, which exhaustively 
considers the cases, both English and American) 
that the general rule, both in this country and in 
I~nglish jurisprudence before the time of the Dec-
laration of Independence, was to the effect that, 
unless the trrms of the contract specifically, or 
at least by necessary implication, negatived the 
right to perform within a year, the statute did 
not avply if under any possible circumstances 
performance was possible within that time; this 
was without regard to the intent of the parties, 
even though they obviously intended and expected 
performance to last beyond a year, unless such 
time of performance was a term, expressed or 
implied of the contract." 
The Court tlwn 1vent on to acknowledge the existence 
of the minority rule under Florida law and decided the 
case on the basis of this minority rule relying chiefly 
on Smnmcrnll v. Thoms, 3 Fla. 298 (1850). Appellant 
nrges this Court to reject the minority rule. To do other-
wi HP would result in the perpetuation of considerable un-
ct>rtainty in matters of this type where it was necessary 
to go beyond the te1ms of the agreement and make an 
Pxtensive and often confusing and frequently unreward-
ing excursion into collateral and speculative circum-
stances. It should be the aim of the law to promote and 
(•stablish certainty and stability, in contractual relation-
ships, be they written or oral, and this laudable objec-
tive is served much better by adoption of the majority 
rnl<~ requiring interpretation of the teims of the agree-
ment only, rather than the minority rule which requires 
tlrn eXPreise of greater subjectivity and, therefore, in-
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creases the danger of uncertainty and instability through 
such needlessly complex legal machinations. 'rhe minor-
ity rule does not possess any salutory qualities which 
commend it over and above the majority rule; it is sim-
ply a more complex and uncertain route to basic, but 
always elusive, judicial perfection and should be rejected 
as an inferior legal tool. 
Appellant's Brief cited Granvold v. Whaley, ::\9 
\Yash. 2d 710, 237 P.2d 1026, wherein it was held that per-
formanre of a certain agreement was not possible until 
a certain dam "'as completed and the fact that the dam 
could have been completed within one year but was not 
expected to be and was not, in fact, completed for three 
years, did not place the agreement within the purview 
of the Statute (Citing 2 Corbin on Contracts 541, Sec. 
4-1-5, quoted on Page 12 of Appellant's Brief). Respon-
dent alleges that this case is factually dissimilar from 
the case now before the Court stating that "Independent 
evidence shmved the enterprise probably would no.t be 
succPssful until a certain dam was completed and also 
affirmatively showed that the dam could be completed 
in less than one year." This assertion does not contra-
dict Respondent's position but, rather, supports it. There 
is nothing in the agreement to finance or in the sub-
contract ·which, within the terms thereof, prohibits per-
formance within one year, and, therefore, the Statute is 
not applicable. The vVashington Court stated at Pg. 
1031 of the Pacific Reporter: 
"For example, the Army engineers in charge 
of the construction of the locks might have de-
cided for aught that appears in the record to ex-
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pedite the completion of the lodrn so as to be 
usable within one year. For the doing of a thing 
to be impossible, it must be physically or legally 
ineapable of being done." 
There is nothing in the record which indicates that 
perfor:mance of the subcontract and, hence, of the agree-
mPnt to finance, was physically or legally incapable of 
being done within one year, although it was expected 
that the subcontract work would take more than one 
Far which would not, incidentally, necessarily mean that 
tlw agreement to finance would take more than one year 
as will be pointed out later. 
Appellant has also relied upon the recent case of 
Commrrcial Security Bank v. Hodson, 15 Utah 2d 388, 
:-rn3 P.2cl 482, wherein the Court stated: 
"'J'he exact length of time that this loan 
should last is not specified, but there is nothing 
in the evidence which indicates that the loan 
should not terminate in less than a year." 
Respondent alleges that this case is not pertinent 
hecause the length of time that the loan should last is 
set at more than one year, to-wit, date of ''final pay-
ment" on the subcontract. This is not so. There was no 
date established to which the agreement to finance had 
to continue. The agreement to finance could have been 
fulfilled and completed in two ways, namely, (1) At the 
date of "final payment" on the subcontract and even 
though there was an upper limit set in the subcontract as 
to how long the work could take, there was no limitation 
as to how quickly it would or could be performed and, 
PVPn though it may have taken more than one year, 
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then• was nothing in either the terms of tlw suhconhad 
or in the tt>rms of the agn~elll<='nt to finance which pro-
hihited iwrfonnance \\-ithin one ypar; and (:2) Upon Ap-
pellant construction company finding ·within one year 
that it no longer needPd financing to continue the projcd 
and inasmuch as such loans were to bP made onl>- "a~ 
and when rPquired" by Appellant, such contingPncy could 
very easily have occurred within one year. 
As a matter of fact, the tPstimony takPn during th!· 
course of the trial indicates at several points that joh~ 
similar to that which Appellant had undertaken freqnent-
1>- require financing only dnring the early or initial 
stages of the project and that such subcontractors there-
after become able to function ·without financing during 
the later and final stages of construction when the heavy 
and ex1wnsive work has been com1Jleted and this point 
was fully explained to Respondent Bank. 
I\I r. ·w al sh testified (T .-66) as follows: 
"A. Mr. Barlow asked how ·would the joh 
prnct>ed. And I told him that normally these johs 
start out that a pPrson has to involve certain 
sums of monev into tlwrn before tlw monev starts 
to come hack· and that the first part of 'the job 
was more expensive to perform than the latter 
part; that the>T would probably have to go and 
invest mon('Ys before the monev would corn<' hark. 
And I said tlwv would have mo.re money at a latPI" 
date than at ~nv other time. And that from the 
hPst figures that I could make out there would be 
a $70,000.00 cash profit plus the acquisition of 
the machinen- that .l\f & S was going to acquirr 
to fill out th~ir fleet of equipment. 
And that sePrned to satisf>' him as to the f<>as-
ihilit>T of the job." 
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Mr .. Mendenhall testified (T.-81, 82) as follows: 
"A. It - Mr. Walsh done most of the talk-
ing. He introduced himself and told about his or-
ganization and how it operated and how they 
disbnrs0d the money and so forth. And he told 
l\fr. Barlow that it cost a lot of money to start 
a job out and that the money would come later; 
and that we would need this, this revolving credit 
to see us through on this job." 
He said even as big as his company was that 
they had to go borrow operating capital. He says 
it was no sin to have to go borrow to operate, 
C'apital to start out a job. 
So, Mr. Barlow seemed to acknowledge this, 
or accept this." 
Mr. Stoker testified (T.-114) as follows: 
"And I discussed at that time with Mr. Bar-
low how I knew or why I knew that we could 
successfully complete the job, why we could make 
mont>y on the job, approximately ·what we antici-
pated making, and why I felt we could make that; 
hnt, of course, we would need financing as we went 
along, as any contractor needs. And particularly 
starting out a job in the early part, you might 
say in the early half perhaps of any job it takes 
rather Pxtensive financing. And as you go along 
and begin to recover some more of your money, 
it would take less financing." 
Although it is correct to look only to the terms of 
the agreement itself, which terms reveal that M & S was 
to make loans only "as and when required'' and that 
such language could clearly result in a performance in 
lt>ss than one yt>ar, it is helpful to look to this testimony 
whiC'h indicates a strong possibility and even a proba-
bility that, in fact, M & S was likely to have required 
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financing only during tlw early months of the projt•<·t 
and not beyond one year. If :M & S had decided that it 
no longer required financing at any time prior to thP 
expiration of one year, the contract would have been 
fully performed and completed. 
The agreement to finance then falls exactly within 
the rule set forth in Commercial Security Bank v. Hod-
son, supra, as one in which the exact length of time of 
a loan is not specified and one in which there is nothing 
to indicate that the loan should not terminate in les' 
than a year. Therefore, based upon that recent case, 
the Statute of Frauds is not applicable to the agreement 
to finance. 
Appellant referred to Zions Service Corporation v. 
Danielson, 12 Ptah 2d 369, 366 P.2d 982, at Pg. 14 of its 
original brief, and quoted from Column 1 of Pg. 985 
of the Pacific Reporter, which is again set forth here for 
convenience: 
"Y\7here the agreement can he performed 
\Yithin one year, though this be done by election 
of one of the parties to terminate. there can be 
no doubt but that the Statute of Frauds is not 
applic(llJle. '\Ve agree with the following state-
ment from the Restatement of Contracts and be-
lieve it determinative of this question: 
"The words "cannot be fully performed" 
must be taken literally. The fact that per-
formance within a year is entirely improb-
able or not expected by the parties, does not 
bring the contract \\-ithin this Statute.' (Sec. 
198, Comment b.) 
"In Johnson vs. Johnson, 31 Utah 408, 88 P. 
230, we ruled that a contract by a purchaser of 
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land to pay the seller 'for life, one-half of the 
crop:'< produced on the lands' was not within the 
above provision since death might occur within 
one year. The right to terminate a contract at 
any time is likewise such an event a.s may occur 
within a year and hence the statute does not ap-
ply.' (All emphasis added.) 
Respondent attacks this important case as not being 
applicable without really saying why and refers to Wil-
liston on Contracts, Sec. 498, an analysis of which re-
vt·als that it makes a distinction between "an excuse for 
not performing" and "completion of performance.'' In 
fact, the section is entitled "Promises Subject to an Ex-
press Def easance or Providing for Alternative Perform-
:meP." In the same paragraph which Respondent has 
referred to, it is stated at Page 591, Williston on Con-
tracts, Sec. 498: 
". . . The Courts recognize a distinct differ-
enee between a contingency which fulfills the 
tPrms of the contract and a defeasance which pre-
vents fulfillment." 
"vVhere the promise is in the alternative the 
contract is not within the statute if either alterna-
tive can be performed within a year from the date 
when the contract is made, even though the other 
cannot be so performed." 
Appdlant contends that the work under the sub-
eontract could have been completed ·within one year, but 
assuming argnen<lo that it could not be so performed it 
is ohserved that we have another contingency which 
would result in the complete fulfillment and performance 
of the terms of the agreement to finance and not a 
ddeasance which would prevent fulfillment, and that 
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otlwr contingency would be a determination by M & f.; 
at any fonp within one year that it no longer needed 
financing \Vhereupon the agreement wonld have be('n 
fulfilled pursuant to the "as and when'' clause of tlw 
agreern<:>nt. As noted abov<:> in -Williston, S<:>c. 498, such 
conting<:>ncy doPs not place the agreement within thl' 
Statute of Frauds. (Citing Warner v. Te.ras a11d Pacific 
R. Company, supra.) 
It it-; ohvions that Respond<:>nt has failed to mah 
the distinction between an excuse for not performing and 
complPtion of performance. To support this erroneou~ 
vie\\·, Respondent has cited Coan v. Orsinger (spelled 
Prosinger in Respondent's Brief) CCA, D.C. 1959, 265 
F.:2d 5G5, in which case the Appellant was to receive 
$75.00 per wePk and free rent in return for his managing 
some apartments until such time as he finished his 
studies o.f law at Georgetown University or until obliged 
to leave school for poor scholarship or some similar rea-
son. The Court incorrectly held that such agreement wa~ 
baned hy the 8tatute of Frauds. Williston is very criti-
cal of this case, and cites it as an illustration of tlw 
misapplication of the Statute of Frauds saying at Sec. 
498B, Pg. 603: 
"Another instructive case on tlH' misapplica-
tion of the rnle and the 00casional failure or in-
ahilitv of tlw courts to distinguish hehveen ful-
filrne~t and annulment involved an oral agrPement 
for employment providing for alternative per-
formance. In this case, the defendant employer 
agreed to engaged the services of a first-year 
student at the Georgetown Pniversity Law Cen-
ter, for a stipulated consideration as. resid~nt 
manager, 'until the plaintiff cornpk•ted hlS studies 
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as a student duly matriculated in Georgetown Uni-
versity Law Center, Washington, D.C., or was 
obliged to discontinue these studies.' 
Misconceiving the nature of the promise, as 
did the decision in the Sickles case (Packet Co. v. 
8icl'"lcs, 72 US (5 Wall) 580, 18 L.ed. 550) the 
court held that the clause 'if appellant (law stu-
dent) were obliged to discontinue his law studies' 
- a contingency which could occur within a year 
- cont<•mplated an annulment of the contract 
which would operate as a defeasance and that the 
8tatute of Frauds barred recovery. In so holding, 
the majority, of course, failed to distinguish be-
tween a discharge from liability because of a re-
fusal to perform the first clause, and the possibly 
complete and timely perfonnance o.f the second 
provision. Actually, the promise made by the de-
frndant employer was to employ plaintiff as 
resident manager during a period of time which 
would not exreed the time it might take to com-
plPte the curriculum at the Law Center, or a much 
shorter one, if, for one reason or another, plaintiff 
'\\'as obligPd to discontinue' his studies. 'rhus, if 
tlw contemplated contingency occurred within the 
~'Par, it would result in the completion of plain-
tiff's duties as resident manager ·within the year, 
and the requirements of the Statute would be 
satisfied." 
[fospondent relies upon Stahlman v. National Lead 
Co1111H111y, 318 F.2d 388 (19G3); however, a reading of 
!hat ('ase shows that Plaintiff who was seeking to estab-
lish the oral contract testified that such alleged oral con-
traet "was to be a permanent type of arrangement" and 
that it "would be a continuing proeess down through the 
.\'Pan;." Obviously then the tem1s of the contract which . ' 
he was attempting to establish could not by the terms 
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thereof have heen performed within one year and, in-
asmuch as this case is to.tally dissimilar on the facts, 
it has no application to the case at bar nor does Firr:-
rnan 's Fund Inc. Co. v. Williams, 170 1\Iiss. 199, 15-1- So. 
545, in which case the Court said that the "termination" 
contemplated in the case was such as would constitute 
not a performance of the contract but a mere frustration 
thereof. 
Respondent further cites 37 C .. J.S. 557, Frauds. 
Statute of, Sec. 48, which is a correct statement of th~ 
law if applied to the proper factual situation; however, 
Respondent again fails to make the distinction between 
a termination which constitutes "full and complete per-
formance" and a termination which constitutes a "rescis-
sion or cancellation" of the agreement and not a per-
formance o.f it. Additional language contained in that 
section may be helpful to the Court, however. 
"Section -1-8. Possibility of Termination. By ' 
Actual Perforrnance Under Permissive Provision. 
''Although by the terms of an oral agreement, 
a period in excess of a year may be ailmved for 
its perfonnance, yet, if on the happening of a 
certain stipulated event which may happen within 
a year, it can be completely performed consist-
entlv with the rights and understanding of the 
parties thereto, it will not be regarded as within 
the statute.'' (Citing Blue Valley Creamery ·1·. 
Consolidated Products, 81 F.2d 182, Respondent 
again failing to note the difference between a can-
cellation of the agreement and a full and completf' 
performance such as we have in the case at bar.)" 
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f,'astrrn Statrs Refrigerating Company v. Teasdale, 
(Missouri), 211 S.W. 693, involved a factual situation 
,,·]iprein Defendant was obligated to store apples for a 
period of fifteen months but withdrew them from storage 
\rithin less than a year and claimed that this termina-
tion took the agreement out of the Statute of Frauds. 
Thl' distinction was again made between a termination 
of that class which may be performed within a year 
<·onsistentl~· with the terms of the agreement and not 
in violation thereof and a termination which constitutes 
a eanedlation or def easance of the contract. 
Respondent cites 37 C.J.S. 555, Frauds, Statute of, 
Ree. ·Hi, to refute Appellant's contention that the statute 
\ms not applicable because Appellant may have required 
financing for a period of time shorter than one year. 
RPspondent has failed to note that this section is en-
tit!Pd "Agreements Definitely Fixing Time of Perform-
ance 1\lore Than One Year" and has a subheading which 
~tatrs "A contract to do a particular act during, at or 
aft<_.r a definite period of time which is more than a year 
afkr the making of the contract is within the statute." 
Ohviously, this section has no applicability to the case 
at bar inasmuch as the "as and when required" provi-
'iion of the agreement to finance does not definitely fix 
the time of performance at more than a year and is not 
"a definite period of time which is more than a year 
after the making of the contract." 
I\·rhaps the leading case on the Statute of Frauds 
1~ Warner i·. Texas and Pacific R. Company, 164 U.S. 
+H-:, -!1 L.Ed. 495, 175 S.Ct. 147, which has been referred 
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to abovP. ThP facts of that case an' as follows: Plain-
tiff brought an action against the railroad upon a eon-
tract by which it was agreed between the parties that if 
the Plaintiff \rnuld grade the ground for a switch and ' 
put on the ties at a certain point on the Defendant's 
railroad, the Defendant would rmt down the rails and , 
maintain the S\vitch fo1· the Plaintiff's benefit for ship-
ping purposes as long as he needed it. The Defendant 
railroad pleaded that the contract \\'as oral and withi11 
the Statute of Frauds because it was "not to be iwr-
formed within one year from the making thereof." Tlw 
United States Supreme Court held that under such fact:; 
the Statute of Frauds did not bar the contract. 
The Court makes an extensive and exhaustive review 
of this portion o.f the Statute from its enactment in 
England in 1 G77 to the time of the decision. Based upon 
the decisions reviewed in the exhaustive opinion, thP 
Court made the following pronouncements with respect , 
to that particular case whieh, it is noted, had a factual 
situation virtually identieal with that now before this 
Court. The following is quoted from that opinion at 
Pg. 50+ of L.Ed. and Pgs . .J-3-± and -±35 of the U. S. 
Reports: 
"'rh<> parties may well have expected that tlw 
eontract would continue in force for mon' than 
one vPar; it may have been ve1T improbable that 
it w~uld not do so; and it did, in fact, eontinm· 
in force for a much longer time. But they mad<' 
no stipulation which in terms or by reasonable 
infe1·encf~ required that result. The question 1~ 
not what the probable or expected or adual P('J' 
fonnanct~ of the contract was hut wlwtlwr tlH' 
conh'act, according to the reasonabk~ interprc-
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tation of its terms, required that it should not 
lw performed within a year. No definite term 
of time for the performance of the contract ap~ 
]Wars to have been mentioned or contemplated by 
the parties nor was there any agreernent as to 
tlw amount of lumber to be sawed or shipped by 
the Plaintiff or as to the time dnring which he 
should keep up his mill. The contract of the rail-
rnad company was with and for the benefit o.f the 
Plaintiff personally. The Plaintiff's own testi-
mony shows (although that is not essential) that 
lw understood that the performance of the con-
tract \rnuld end with his mvn life. The obligation 
of the railroad company to maintain the switch 
was in terms limited and restricted by the quali-
fication 'for the Praintiff's benf'fit for shipping 
purposes as long as he needed it;' and no con-
tingency which should put an end to the perform-
ancf' of the contract other than his not needing 
tlw switch for the purpose of his business appears 
to have been in the mouth or in the mind of either 
part~'· If. within a year after the making of the 
contract, the Plaintiff had died or had abandoned 
his old business at this place, or for any other 
reason had ceasf'd to need the switch for the ship-
ping of lumber, the railroad company would have 
lwen no longer under any obligation to maintain 
a switch and the contract would have been brought 
to an Pnd by having been fully perfonned. 
The complete performance of the contract 
depending upon a contingency which might hap-
pen within the year, the contract is not within 
the Statute of Frauds as an 'agreement which is 
not to he performed within the space of one year 
from the making thereof'." 
Ba::;l'd npon a review of the authorities, it has been 
c:hown that the agreement to finance was not within the 
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Statute of Frauds for one or both of the following twr
1 
n~asons; namely, (1) there was nothing which showed 
that the terms of the agreement itself required that thl· 
loans should continu<-' for more than one year; and/m 
(2) that pursuant to the terms of the agreement to fi-
nance Appellant was to secure loans only "as and when 
required'' by Appellant and that the terms of such 
agreement to finance could have been fully perf orrned 
and satisfied at any time within one year upon Appel-
lant's detennination that it no longer required further 
financing and making no loans \\'ith Respondent therP-
after all within one year. 
POINT III 
THE COURT ERRONEOUSLY HELD THAT THE $38,-
852.54 CHECK WAS NOT HELD BY THE BANK IN TRUST 
AS A SPECIAL DEPOSIT OR AS A DEPOSIT FOR A SPE-
CIAL PURPOSE. 
None of the cases cited by Respondent on this point 
involves a factual situation wherein there was a special 
endorsement on a check or where a bank received funds 
with knowledge of a special purpose, as in the case at 
bar. 
Contrary to Respondent's contention, some of the 
September items w<>re, in fact, paid by the check de-
posited and assuming arguendo that they \VPre not, Mr. 
Barlow, the Bank's executive vice-president, had full 
knowledge that his hanl\: was holding several thousand 
dollars worth of payroll checks which M & S expected 
to be paid by the deposit of this check (T.-128, 129), but, 
notwithstanding such knowledge, these checks were dis-
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honored and the funds applied to notes being held by the 
Bank, one of which had not yet become due and another 
of which had been purchased by Bank officials in their 
personal capacity ( T-45-57). 
'!'he authorities cited under Point II of brief of Ap-
pellants adequately support the contention that the Court 
rnlPd incorrectly with respect to Appellant's Second 
Cause of Action. 
POINT IV 
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE 
JURY VERDICT ON THE ISSUE OF DAMAGES. 
Tlw onl:v theory of damages presented to the jury 
was on the basis of loss of anti~ipated profits on the 
Lost Cr0ek Dam Project (R-88) encompassed in the 
Court's instruction on damages. (Instruction 18) The 
jnry was instructed that before an award could be made, 
tht')' 11111st determine with reasonable certainty that the 
Plaintiff would have realized profit from the perform-
aneP of the sub-contract (Instruction No. 18) (R-88). 
Further, in Instruction No. 20 (R-99), the 'Court stated 
that the misfortunes and damages suffered by Plaintiff 
had to be directly caused by Defendant's actions and 
fnrther explained that if financial loss would have 
oeemTed regardless of the breach, no damage could be 
assessed. Thus, the Trial Court properly instructed on 
the questions of certainty, causation and proper items 
to be considered in arriving at a verdict (Instruction 
i\'o. 22) (R-99). One cannot argue, therefore, that the 
jury was misled as to the proper legal criteria. We 
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submit that there was sufficiency of evidence to suppo11 
the jury's verdict. 
(a) Causation, or fact of damage. 
Fnder snb-st'ction (a) o.f RespondPnt's brief, it wa_, 
contended that :JI & S was in such dire finaneial condition 
that its failure was imminent. It \\'as stated: "The col-
lapse of l\I & S was assur('d at the time it signed the sub 
contract of .June 17, 1963 for no amount of financing 
would save a losing job of this size." The Appellant con-
tends that said stat('nwnt is without foundation. As 'rill 
lw s1weifieally shown, under sub-section (b) it ·was clear 
that both the principals of l\I & S and the principals at 
Clearfield State Ba11k looked to the contract in question 
as lwing the basis for the rt>payment of the loans based 
upon the anticipated profits. After all available evidencr 
was pn,sentPd to the Bank, it decided to effectuate tlw 
loans in c1110stion, and it is indeed ironic that now it 
contends that from th(' onset it was a losing job. 
As has heen pointed out, on the trial of this matter. 
Clearfield State Bank did not attempt to corroborat1 
this theory by any direct evidence. All accounting factual 
information was available to Respondent (T-62, 63, 105, 
107, 128, 129). Notwithstanding the fact that no evidence 
of this nature was adduced to sustain the theory of im-
minent financial disaster, the Respondent on pages 28 
and 29 of its brief contends that it was a mathematical 
impossibility for M & S to have finished the job success· 
fully. 
RPspondent's attack is two-pronged: 
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1. 1t C'laims that the job was not progressing satis-
fadorily; and, 
That there were inadequate funds to continue the 
joh. 
In the Statement of Facts, testimony is cited which 
rwg-atc's the theory that the job was not "going well." 
(WP rrf er again to the general contractor's letter of 
Odober 10, 1963 sent to the Bank.) Their theory ignores 
the fact that :!\fr. Stoker explained in great detail that 
a proper claim was being processed for the additional 
\rnrk that was done on the project. It is clear that prior 
to tlw hreach, particularly in light of Mr. Pritchett's 
tP~tiiuony, the failure to honor the checks would neces-
sitate M & S's default on the job and the Bank was so 
\Yarned ( T-87). The real reason for the breach of the 
(·ont ract \\·as not the progression of the job but, rather, 
a" ~Ir. Pritchett testified, that the Bank officers were 
justifiably concerned about the Bank exceeding its legal 
loan limits. 
The Respondent's computation fails to take into 
aecount additional moneys that were due M & S. For 
rxample, it was testified by Mr. Vern Smith that the 
.1obs at Dugway and Cedar City were in the final stages 
of completion and they expected to receive $35,000.00 
(T-183). l\Ir. Vern Smith's testimony also clearly shows 
that the cause of the catastrophe was the breach of the 
agreeUH'nt wherein he testified that once the Bank dis-
honorPd its agreement, M & S was, pursuant to the sub-
"011tract, defaulted on the job and, as a direct re::mlt, 
lost $100,000.00 equity in equipment (T-183). The 
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acCJuisition of this equi11ment vms considered in the di, 
cussion with the Bank as part of the anticipated profit 
of the job. There is, therefore, ample evidence that thf' 
Appellant was progressing with the job and the reason 
for the dire results that occurred was the violation of 
the agreement to continue the financing, which negated 
all possibilities for any profits on the job. 
(h) Amount of damages. 
Respondent in its brief undf~r sub-paragraph b a]. 
leges initially that the jury's finding of damages and 
the Conrt's denial of a motion for a new trial based 
upon the damages awarded should be reversed for thP 
reason that th<.> Appellant failed to prove damages with 
reasonable certainty. In discussing the question of a 
jury verdict based upon anticipated profits, one must 
look at the facts of each particular case in determining 
whether or not the verdict should stand. The courts have 
made nnmerous distinctions based upon the type of busi-
ness involved, the nature of the testimony, the avail-
ability of another remedy, and other varying fact situ-
ations. rro cite general principles is, we feel, of little 
help. 
The Respondent cites 15 Am. Jur. Damages Section 
150. Appellant feels constrained to set forth the sen-
tence following the one quoted: 
"But it must be borne in mind that since 
profits are prospectivl? they must, to some extent, 
be uncertain and problematical, and so, on that 
arcount or on account of the difficulties in the 
way of proof, a person complaining of breach of 
contract cannot be deprived of all remedy, and 
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uncertainty merely as to the amount of profits 
that would have been made does not prevent a 
recovery.'' 
An<l, again, in the second paragraph cited by the Re-
spondent we believe the complete sentence should be set 
out: 
''; but if, ex·cept for the wrongful act, there 
must have been profits, notwithstanding any other 
circumstances in existence at the time of the 
1wrpetration of the wrong, the question of re-
spectiveness and contingency is actually nega-
tived." 
W <' do not disagree with the Utah cases c~ted by 
H.••spondent but feel that they are not in point and are 
not helpful to the factual situation at hand. For example, 
the factual situation in VanZyverden vs. Farrar, 15 U.2d 
367, 39:3 P.2d 468, involved a situation whereby the evi-
dPnce temfored was a mere opinion that the owner felt 
if he would have received $3,000.00, this money would 
haVf~ allowed him to make a profit on the ranch. 
ln Jenkins vs. Morgan, 123 Utah 480, 260 P.2d 532, the 
case did not involve a loss of anticipated profits factual 
situation. 
As has been pointed out, the question of damages in 
this ease was not based upon the loss of profits of M & S 
eorporation, its goodwill or net worth but, rather, was 
submitted solely on the question of lo•ss of profits that 
j[ & S suffered on the Lost Creek Dam Project. The 
Bank examined and reviewed carefully the sub-contract 
between the Appellant and Steenberg. There is no ques-
tion that it based its loan upon the assignment of this 
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contract. 'I'his fact is what distinguishes the factna 
situation here from the cases cited by Respondent. Jr 
other words, the parties looked to the profits as a con 
sideration of the agreement. Mr. Barlow, an offiCl'i 
of the bank, testified ( T-21) that the assignment rn 
the proceeds of the job was all the collateral that i1 
needed. Mr. Emil vValsh, an officer of Steenber~ 
testified that he explained the potential profit to Clear 
field State Bank (T-57) and, further, that he revieweu 
with the Bank the anticipated profits (T-G4). This testi 
mony of looking toward the anticipated profits was cor 
roborated by l\Ir. Mendenhall (T-83). Russell D. Stoker'~ 
testimony is also clear that the question of anticipated 
profits was the basis of the loan agreement ('l'-114). Thl' 
Respondent cannot deny this fact for, in fact, its own 
officers complained that its financing was allowing them 
(Respondent) to go on the job and they should receiw 
one-third of the profits instead of a measly 8% (T-12.tl. 
Here we have a situation ·where the Bank is now urging 
upon this Court that the anticipated profits were too 
speculative. However, they originally only looked to 
these profits and judged them, as bankers, sufficient to 
extend credit. 
In examining the issue of whether or not the dam 
ages ·were proven w-ith sufficient certainty, ·we feel it is 
noteworthy to examine Section 331 of the Restatement 
of Contracts as to the degree of certainty required in 
these cases : 
"a. Th<:> reqnire~nent of reasonable certainty 
does not mean that the plaintiff can recover notl.1-
ing unless he establishes the total amount of Ins 
harm; nor does it mean that he cannot get dan1-
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ages unless he proves the exact amount of his 
harm. The requirement merely excludes those 
elements of harm that cannot be evaluated with 
a reasonable degree of certainty. There is usually 
little <lifficulty in proving the amount of actual 
expenditures, even though it may be impossible to 
prove the amount of expected profits (see sec. 
~)33). Furthermore. there are cases in which the 
exrwrience of mankind is convincing that a sub-
stantial pecuniary loss has occurred, while at the 
same time it is of such a character that the amount 
in money is incapable of proof. In these cases 
the defendant usually has reason to foresee this 
difficulty of proof and should not be allowed to 
profit by it. In such cases, it is reasonable to re-
qni re a lesser degree of certainty as to the amount 
of loss, leaving a gteater degree of discretion to 
the jur~·, subject to the usual supervisory power 
of the court." 
ThP Respondent has cited U. S. v. Griffith, 210 Fed. 
~d l l, which involves a different situation than here, in 
that the only evidence tendered was the President o.f the 
corporation's statement that he believed the corporation 
would have earned approximately $5,000.00 a year. Of 
rourse, this evidence was not allowed to sustain the 
verdict. However, as to the necessity in regard to cer-
tainty of damages, the ·Court did state as follows: 
"Prospective profits are necessarily some-
what uncertain and problematical but in cases 
where damages are definitely attributable to the 
wrong of the defendant and are only uncertain 
as to amount, they will not be denied even though 
they are difficult of ascertainment." 
f.lee also Br01c11 vs. Alkire, 295 Fed. 2nd 411. Therefore, 
RespondPnt's position that the jury verdict should be 
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set aside because of uncertainty is fallacious becau~r 
there was, as has been discussed, definite damages at-
tributable to the breach. 
The issues basically presented in this case have been 
discussed and decided in Cornmercial Security Bnnk n. 
Hodson, 15 U.2d 388; 393 P.2d 482. The similarity in tlw 
fact situation is remarkable. This case involved an agreP-
ment of continuing financing and of damages based upon 
prospective profits. The majority of the Court in that 
case found that the evidence was sufficient to suvport 
actual, and not merely speculative, damages. Because of 
the similarity factually and legally of this case, we feel 
it is not redundant to examine the Court's statements 
closely. The precise defenses raised here were raised by 
the Bank. The Court held, however, that one cannot 
claim that anticipated profits are too speculative when 
competent business people look to the same as security 
for their loans and stated: 
"In a business venture of this kind there is 
hound to be some uncertainty. But with a project 
-which seems certain to succeed by competent busi-
nessmen, the evidence cannot he considered to be 
merely speculative. 1The evidence shows that 
when the vice-president learned the details of thr 
project Jw said he did not see hovY they could lose. 
Also the bank president seemed confident of the 
success of this venture, and the loan committee 
showed the same reaction by approving the loan. 
Also the appellants, who are e)\._rperienced in th~s 
kind of business, were certain of their success if 
the dressed beef turnover loan were approved. 
So we find nothing that is merely speculative in 
this project. For it seems to have been recognized 
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by both bankers and the appellants as being a 
fairly certain business project." 
lt is Appellant's position that factually it is in 
a :-:trong-er and more persuasive position than the parties 
in the Commercial Security Bank case and meet the ob-
jrcti ons of the finding of actual damages voiced in the 
dissenting opinion. In that case, the parties planned to 
gd into the business of a custom-kill arrangement in the 
prnces:.;ing of beef. The evidence tendered as to costs 
was that the parties anticipated an average profit per 
a11imal of a certain dollar sum. However, it was neces-
sary that a sufficient number of animals be processed 
in order to effectuate a desired net amount. To operate 
this new venture, Appellants requested the Bank to. fi-
nance them on a turnover revolving loan plan. Subse-
quent thereto, the parties were contacted by the Bank 
off ic0r wherein he stated that something had gone wrong 
and that a bank customer had threatened to withdraw 
unless they breached their contract. Upon its breach, the 
Appdlants were unable to continue and brought an action 
for prospective damages. The evidence of profit in the 
Commercial Security case was the cost item of processing 
one item and the projected profit based upon the un-
known quantity of the market. Justice Crockett in his 
dissent disagreed with the majority on the basis of the 
uncertainty of availability of livestock, the extent of the 
SPasonal weather, the scarcity or the abundance of feed, 
and the instability of prices, both of feed and animals. 
In the present case, the figures presented to the parties 
and 11nderstood by them were firm. Each item of excava-
tion was charted out, based upon gross estimates and 
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costs. The cost figure was calculated mathematically and 
based upon the experience of a qualified engineer and thr" 
same, therefore, is sufficient to support actual damage~. 
The contingencie.s objected to in the dissenting opinion 
were not present here. Appellant contends, thereforP, 
that the holding in the Commercial Securit,y Bank case, 
which was the pattern of the trial in this matter, be 
sustained. Also see Merchant Bank of Canada vs. Sims, 
122 vVash. 106; 209 P. 113, cited by the majority opinion 
m this case. 
In Sposaro vs. Matt Malspino & Co., 63 vYash. 2<l 
679; 38.S P.2d 970, the same issues are discussed. In 
that case, a sub-contractor had bid on a particular joh 
for the defendant-contractor, and based upon this bid 
and anticipated gains from the contract, the general con-
tractor loaned the sub-contracto.r sums of money over a 
period of time to meet payrolls. On the last check the 
contractor "stopped payment" on the grounds that thP 
jobs were not proceeding as he had anticipated. During 
this period, the sub-contractor ran into unexpected prob-
lems in the construction of the sewer. On conflicting 
evidence, the jury decided that the general contractor 
had wrongfully terrnjnated his agreement. The issue 
presented was whether or not there was an error in sub-
mitting the case to the jury on the issue of anticipated 
profits. The Court in detail on page 97 4 of the Pacifa 
Reporter ontlined the proof offered by the sub-contrac-
tor. They sho·wed that this was the largest contract un-
dertaken by them. They showed that they studied tht 
bids and inspected the areas of construction and studied 
the plans and specifications. Based upon this study, they 
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hrokP the contract down by listing all the materials to 
he nsPd, the price based upon quotation from suppliers, 
the equipmc>nt the crew thought necessary to operate the 
joh. Their estimates and computations were based in part 
npon their general experience in the business and the 
handling of the same type of equipment and crews in 
tlw past. Testimony was tendered on the computation 
of how much per foot it would cost to do the sewerage. 
A !Ro, costs "·ere tendered as to the estimated cost o.f 
excavation. Based upon this, the parties testified as to 
their total loss of profits. 
The issue presented, therefore, was whether or not 
tlw damages under this form of proof were illusory, 
uncertain and speculative. Appellant insisted that the 
sanw was true beeause the sub-contractor actually lost 
money on that part of the contract partially performed 
Jirior to his breach. Respondents argued that they had 
;;;hown a pr<>cise and detailed manner in preparing their 
hid. The Court held: 
" ( G) But we also aeknow ledge and give equal 
status to the correlative rule that, where an ente:r-
prise or undertaking in which profits were con-
templated is thwarted by tortious misconduct or 
hv reason of a breach of contract, the loss of 
a~ticipated profits, if proved with reasonable 
certainty, may be an item of damages occasioned 
hv the tortious misconduct or breach of contract. 
Difficulty in ascertaining the damages, or uncer-
tainty as to the amount, provides no basis in logic 
for denial in toto. If the evidence affords a rea-
sonable hasis for establishing the loss, an issue 
arises to be resolved by the trier of the facts. 
Wcn.zler & Ward Plumbing & Heating Co. v. Sel-
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Zen, 53 Wash.2d 96, 330 P.2d 1068; Gaasland Co. 
·v. Hyak Lbr. & llf ill1Dork, 42 Wash.2d 705, 25i 
P.2d 784; Dunseath V. Hallauer, .n vVash.2d 895 
253 P.2d 408." ' 
Prior in this brief we have set forth in detail thP 
type of proof that was submitted in this rase as a ha8i~ 
for anticipatt>d profits. It is clear from the evidencP 
that this c:ase is different than many other cases involv. 
ing anticipated profits in that !Clearfield State Bank 
cannot complain of being assessed on this basis for thP 
reason that the same was within the contemplation 
of the parties at the time the~' entered the agreement. 
The job had just shortly begun prior to the breach and 
the cost figures relied upon by Respondent were im-
material because of the unexpected core trenching prob-
lem (T-118 to 123). The Bank was on notice of the core 
trenching problem (T-123) and agreed to continue to 
finance. The fact of damage is based upon Stoker's 
testimony that the gross revenue expected was $754,-
000.00 and the cost of the job would approximate $525,-
000.00. The effect of the breach is clear and Mr. Vern 
Smith testified that as a result of the breach l\f & S 
lost $100,000.00 equity in equipment. (Said equipment 
was included within the anticipated profit estimate.) 
Under the circumstances of this case, the evidence on 
anticipated profits was based on the best evidence avail-
able, that is, the actual computation agreed to by thP 
parties plus the expert opinion of l\fr. Stoker based upon 
his computations. Williston on Contracts, Revised Edi-
tion, Vo,lume 5, Section 1346, Page 3872, states that evi· 
dence of experts is admissible to sustain an action for 
damages based upon pro'Spective profits. Also see 
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U11l'rini Stone Co. vs. P. J. Carling Constrnction Co., 
1-tO {T.S. 20-±; 36 S.Ct. 300; 60 Law Ed. 636, which holds 
that: 
"The profits which a subcontrn0tor probably 
would have gained if the contract had been pro-
ceeded with in the ordinary manner should not 
have been excluded from the jury as contingent 
and speculative in an action by him against the 
general contractors for the latter's breach of the 
contract, where there was testimony from an ex-
perienced witness as to the probable cost to the 
subcontractor o.f furnishing the materials and 
doing the work called for by the subcontract." 
POINT V 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING RE-
SPONDENT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL. 
1t is the Appellant's position that the matters raised 
by Respondent in this point have been substantially cov-
erd in this brief and extensive comment would be repe-
titious. 
A::; to the admission of Mr. Stoker's testimony, how-
PVPl', it is clear that such testimony was proper. 
Under the circumstances of this case, the contract 
on the Lost Creek Darn had just commenced prior to the 
hrl-'aeh of the contract. Mr. Stoker testified with suffi-
eiPnt certaintv to the value of the anticipated profits 
and how the same was determined. It must be remem-
hrn,d that there is a clear distinction between the mea-
~nre of proof necessary to establish the fact that the 
l'laintiff ::;nstained some damages and a measure of proof 
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necessary to enable the jury to fix an amount. 8tor1v 
ParchamPnt Paper Co. vs. Patterson Parchment Pupn 
Co., 282 F.S. 555, 51 S.Ct. 248, 75 L. Ed. 54.J., Willi~ton 
on Contracts, Sec. 1346 at page 3779, drmvs the follo\\•inn 
~ 
analogy: 
"'In an English case the plaintiff hy contract 
was entitled to lwcome one of fifty participants 
in a bPauty contest, twelve of whom wen-' to lw 
selected b>· judge>s for the bestowal of prizes. ThP 
plaintiff was not notified of the time when the 
decision and award was to be madt> and, therefon·. 
failed to ]irt>sent hersdf, and twelve other p1T-
sons wt>re awarued the prizes. A recovery of suh-
stantial damages ,\·as upheld. It was recognized 
that tlw plaintiff would have had, if the dPfrndant 
had not committed a breach, about one chancP in 
four of securing a pri,,;e. The court declined to 
take a distinction hetween a chance and a proba-
bility so far as the rig·ht to recovery was con-
cerned. As was said in a Minnesota decision: 'lt 
is no exoneration to defendant that his rniscon-
dlrnt, -which has made inquiry as to the quanhu11 
of harm necessary, renders that inquiry difficult. 
rl'he best the law can do is to award approximate 
compensation. Its failure to. do even and exact 
justice in such cases is not more conspicuous than 
in many others. No other remedy is available. 
To allo~v onl~v for loss of time and ~xpenses would 
put a pn~mium upon breaking contracts and den) 
substantial justice.' " 
It is submitted that when a breach ocC'urs prior to tlw 
time an experience of cost items cannot intelligently be 
arrived at, the> proof of anticipated profits is sufficit>nl 
to sustain a verdict. 1\Ir. Stoker's testimony, however. 
was not as flimsy as that suggested by the Respondent 
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for, in fact, he testifid with great particularity as to the 
cost faetor in regard to the core trench investment. 
R.v asserting that the Statute of Frauds question 
should have been submitted to the jury Respondent 
is again urging this Court to adopt the minority posi-
tion as sPt forth in J1arkowitz Bros., Inc. v. The John A. 
rolpc Ounstructi.on Co., supra, referred to under Po.int 
lI ahovl'. Although the determination of such problems 
is <'1iSPntially a question of law, the minority rule would 
requi 1·p juries not only to make findings of fact but also 
lo \\Testle with the complex and subtle provisions of 
tht> Statute of Frauds before reaching a decision. It is 
snhmitfrd that Respondent's position is erroneous for the 
following reasons: 
1. 'I'here was no factual issue to be determined by 
the jury in regard to the Statute of Frauds unless the 
Court is prPpared to accept the minority rule hereto.fore 
disem;s<·d. 
2. That the Statute of Frauds question presented 
in this caHe is a legal one, not a factual one. 
As to the argument that the damages in this case 
ill'<' <'Xcessive, we believe that it should be pointed out 
that thP procedure used in Davis County was to submit 
th,, que:-;tion of liability in the form of two special inter-
rogatories. After each of these interrogatories was an-
swered in the affirmative, the jury was instructed 
As to damages and allowed to deliberate on the same. 
~Peondly, the same motion was ar~ed to the Trial Judge 
and ht> rP jected this theory o.f excessive damages due 
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to prejudice. Again, the Respondent relies upon th~ 
Abstract of Bids, which certainly do€sn 't rise to th1, 
level claimed for it. The Respondent ignores or continue, 
to ignore the fact that the cost was high because 
o.f additional work done and not because the job was 
progressing poorly and that Appellant was protcctrrl 
'under the subcontract with Steenberg and entitled to re-
ceive payment for sitch .additional work pursuant to the 
express terms of such sitbcontra.ct. (T-103, 104) 
POINT VI 
THE COURT ERRONEOUSLY ENTERED JUDGMENT 
IN FAVOR OF THE BANK ON ITS COUNTERCLAIMS AND 
CROSS COMPLAINT WHEN THE EVIDENCE SHOWED 
THAT THE NOTES WERE SECURED AND THE BANK HAD 
DESTROYED ITS SECURITY IN AN AMOUNT IN EXCESS 
OF THE AMOUNT OF THE NOTES. 
Respondent's Point VI discusses those matters which 
were raised in Point III of Brief of Appellants and 
requires no reply except to point out that if, as Re-
spondent claims, the Bank had the right to receive the 
Steenberg check, even so, it was bound to receive and 
apply such check pursuant to and in accordance with 
the terms of the assignment and the terms of the written 
endorsement set forth on the ha.ck of such check. 
CONCLUSION 
The lower court erred in granting an order for 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the basis of 
an alleged Statute of Frauds violation and, further, erred 
in refusing to grant judgment for Appellant on its second 
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causP of action. Such order should be vacated and judg-
uwnt entered in favor of Appellant in accordance with 
the wrdict for damages found by the jury at the trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
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